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Abstract. Due to its remarkable performance and potential resistance
to quantum attacks, NTRUEncrypt has drawn much attention recently;
it also has been standardized by IEEE. However, classical NTRUEncrypt
lacks a strong security guarantee and its security still relies on heuris-
tic arguments. At Eurocrypt 2011, Stehle´ and Steinfeld first proposed a
variant of NTRUEncrypt with a security reduction from standard prob-
lems on ideal lattices. This variant is restricted to the family of rings
Z[X]/(Xn + 1) with n a power of 2 and its private keys are sampled
by rejection from certain discrete Gaussian so that the public key is
shown to be almost uniform. Despite the fact that partial operations,
especially for RLWE, over Z[X]/(Xn + 1) are simple and efficient, these
rings are quite scarce and different from the classical NTRU setting. In
this work, we consider a variant of NTRUEncrypt over prime cyclotomic
rings, i.e. Z[X]/(Xn−1 + · · · + X + 1) with n an odd prime, and obtain
IND-CPA secure results in the standard model assuming the hardness
of worst-case problems on ideal lattices. In our setting, the choice of
the rings is much more flexible and the scheme is closer to the original
NTRU, as Z[X]/(Xn−1 + · · ·+X +1) is a large subring of the NTRU ring
Z[X]/(Xn−1). Some tools for prime cyclotomic rings are also developed.
Keywords: Lattice-based cryptography · NTRU · Learning with
errors · Provable security
1 Introduction
The well-known public key system NTRU was created and refined by Hoffstein,
Pipher and Silverman in [17,18]. The NTRU encryption scheme, NTRUEncrypt,
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is one of the fastest known lattice-based cryptosystems and regarded as an alter-
native to RSA and ECC due to its potential of countering attacks by quantum
computers. The underlying problem of NTRUEncrypt has been used to design
various cryptographic primitives including digital signatures [16], identity-based
encryption [8] and multi-linear maps [11,23]. In the course of assessing the secu-
rity of NTRU, Coppersmith and Shamir first claimed in [5] that one can convert
breaking NTRU to solving hard problems on the so-called NTRU lattice. Then an
army of cryptanalyses [1,2,4,9,10,12,15,19,21,22,29,34] have brought security
estimations on NTRU and its variants, and NTRU is still considered secure in
practice.
The Learning With Errors problem (LWE), introduced by Regev in 2005 [32],
is shown to be as hard as certain lattice problems in the worst case. The Ring
Learning With Errors problem (RLWE) is an algebraic variant of LWE, proposed
by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [25], whose hardness is guaranteed by some
hard problems over ideal lattices. Due to its better compactness and efficiency
over LWE, RLWE has been used as the foundation of new cryptographic applica-
tions. In a celebrated paper [33], Stehle´ and Steinfeld first modified NTRUEncrypt
by incorporating RLWE and proved that the security of NTRU follows by a reduc-
tion from RLWE provided that a right set of parameters are used, which is the
first sound theoretical base for the security of NTRU in the asymptotic sense.
It is worth noting that several novel ideas and powerful techniques have been
developed in [33]. One remarkable contribution is to show that, for n being
a power of 2, and private keys f, g sampled according suitable conditions and
parameters from the ring Z[X]/(Xn + 1), the public key h = fg is close to that
uniformly sampled under the statistical distance. Based on the provably secure
NTRU scheme, more interesting cryptographic primitives are achieved, such as
fully homomorphic encryption [3,24], proxy re-encryption [30].
In most known ring-based cryptosystems, the rings of the form Z[X]/(X2
m
+
1) are preferred choices. This family of rings has some nice algebraic features and
various results on it have been already established. However, as these rings are
very scarce, it has a limitation on the choice of the rings. It is noted that another
family of rings, the prime cyclotomic rings of the form R = Z[X]/(Xn−1 + · · ·+
X + 1) with n being a prime, is also of particular interest in many aspects,
especially in the context of RLWE and NTRU. As a large subring, this ring is
much closer to the original NTRU ring. It is also remarked that a class of subfield
attacks [1] is proposed recently and affects the asymptotic security of NTRU for
large moduli q. Note that the subfield attack is not applicable to the setting of
[33], but it is still meaningful to consider NTRU over the fields with no subfields
of desired relative degree. In this sense, prime cyclotomic ring seems a good
choice of the potential to counter the subfield attack. Establishing IND-CPA
(indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack) secure results with respect
to this class of rings will be an important topic. Indeed, as stated in [33], the
results for Z[X]/(X2
m
+ 1) are likely to hold for more general cases including
that for prime cyclotomic rings. However, to the best of our knowledge, there
were no actual discussions on this issue found in literature.
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Our Contribution. The main purpose of this paper is to study the problem of
provable security of NTRU in a modified setting with respect to prime cyclotomic
rings. We show results similar to that of [33] still hold over prime cyclotomic
rings. Consequently, to instantiate a provably secure NTRU, the density of usable
cyclotomic polynomial degree n < N is increased from Θ
(
log N
N
)
to Θ
(
1
log N
)
.
Even though some main ideas of [33] are applicable in our discussion, many
technical differences also need to be taken care of. Furthermore, some new results
on prime cyclotomic rings developed here might be of general interest. We believe
that these results could be used to design more applications based on prime
cyclotomic rings.
Organization. We start in Sect. 2 with some notations and basic facts that will
be useful to our discussion. We shall develop and prove a series of relevant
results over prime cyclotomic rings in Sect. 3. Section 4 describes a modified
NTRUEncrypt over prime cyclotomic rings and a reduction to its IND-CPA secu-
rity from RLWE which has been proven hard under worst-case assumptions on
ideal lattices. We conclude in Sect. 5. We have a couple of results whose proofs
are similar to that in [33], these proofs are included in AppendicesA, B and C
for completeness.
2 Preliminaries
Lattice. A lattice L is a discrete subgroup of Rm and represented by a basis,
i.e. there is a set of linearly independent vectors b1, · · · ,bn ∈ Rm such that
L = {∑i xibi|xi ∈ Z}. The integer m is the dimension and the integer n is the
rank of L. A lattice is full-rank if its rank equals its dimension. The first minimum
λ1(L) (resp. λ∞1 (L)) is the minimum of Euclidean (resp. ∞) norm of all non-zero
vectors of the lattice L. More generally, the k-th minimum λk(L) for k ≤ n is the
smallest r such that there are at least k linearly independent vectors of L whose
norms are not greater than r. Given a basis B = (b1, · · · ,bn) of a full-rank lattice
L, the set P(B) = {∑i cibi|ci ∈ [0, 1)} is the fundamental parallelepiped of B
whose volume |det(B)| is an invariant of L, called the volume of L and denoted
by det(L). The dual lattice of L is the lattice L̂ = {c ∈ Rm|∀i, 〈c,bi〉 ∈ Z} of
the same dimension and rank with L.
Given a ring R with an additive isomorphism θ mapping R to the lattice
θ(R) in an inner product space and an ideal I of R, we call the sublattice θ(I)
an ideal lattice. Due to their smaller space requirement and faster operation
speed, ideal lattices have been a popular choice for most lattice-based cryptosys-
tems. More importantly, the hardness of classical lattice problems, SVP (Shortest
Vector Problem) and γ-SVP (Approximate Shortest Vector Problem with approx-
imation factor γ), does not seem to substantially decrease (except maybe very
large approximate factors [6]). Thus, it is believed that the worst-case hardness
of γ-SVPover ideal lattices, denoted by γ-Ideal-SVP, is against subexponential
quantum attacks, for any γ ≤ poly(n).
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Probability and Statistics. Let D be a distribution over a discrete domain E.
We write z ←↩ D to represent the random variable z that is sampled from the
distribution D and denote by D(x) the probability of z evaluates to x ∈ E.
We denote by U(E) the uniform distribution over a finite domain E. For two
distributions D1,D2 over a same discrete domain E, their statistical distance
is Δ(D1;D2) = 12
∑
x∈E |D1(x) − D2(x)|. Two distributions D1,D2 are said to
be statistically close with respect to n if their statistical distance Δ(D1;D2) =
o(n−c) for any constant c > 0.
Gaussian Measures. We denote by ρr,c(x) the n-dimensional Gaussian function
with center c ∈ Rn and width r, i.e. ρr,c(x) = exp
(
−π‖x−c‖2r2
)
. When the center
is 0, the Gaussian function is simply written as ρr(x). Let S be a subset of Rn,
we denote by ρr,c(S) (resp. ρr(S)) the sum
∑
x∈S ρr,c(x) (resp.
∑
x∈S ρr(x)).
Let DL,r,c be the discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice L with center
c and width r, the probability of a vector x ∈ L under this distribution is
DL,r,c(x) =
ρr,c(x)
ρr,c(L) . For δ > 0, the smoothing parameter ηδ(L) is the smallest
r > 0 such that ρ1/r(L̂) ≤ 1 + δ. The smoothing parameter is bounded in terms
of some lattice quantities. The following lemmata will be useful in our discussion.
Lemma 1 ([28], Lemma 3.3). Let L ⊆ Rn be a full-rank lattice and δ ∈ (0, 1).
Then ηδ(L) ≤
√
ln(2n(1+1/δ))
π · λn(L).
Lemma 2 ([31], Lemma 3.5). Let L ⊆ Rn be a full-rank lattice and δ ∈ (0, 1).
Then ηδ(L) ≤
√
ln(2n(1+1/δ))/π
λ∞1 (L̂)
.
Lemma 3 ([28], Lemma 4.4). Let L ⊆ Rn be a full-rank lattice and δ ∈ (0, 1).
For c ∈ Rn and r ≥ ηδ(L), we have Prb←↩DL,r,c(‖b − c‖ ≥ r
√
n) ≤ 1+δ1−δ2−n.
Lemma 4 ([14], Corollary 2.8). Let L′ ⊆ L ⊆ Rn be full-rank lattices and
δ ∈ (0, 12 ). For c ∈ Rn and r ≥ ηδ(L′), we have Δ(DL,r,c mod L′;U(L/L′)) ≤ 2δ.
Lemma 5 ([14], Theorem 4.1). There exists a polynomial-time algorithm
that, given a basis (b1, · · · ,bn) of a lattice L ⊆ Zn, a parameter r =
ω(
√
log n)max ‖bi‖ and c ∈ Rn, outputs samples from a distribution statisti-
cally close to DL,r,c with respect to n.
Furthermore, we denote by ψr the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and
width r over R and by ψnr the spherical Gaussian distribution over R
n of the
vector (v1, · · · , vn) in which each vi is drawn from ψr independently. In this
paper, we shall restrict ψr over Q rather than R. As explained in [7], this will
only lead to a negligible impact on our results.
Cyclotomic Ring. Let ξn be a primitive n-th complex root of unity and Φn(X)
the n-th cyclotomic polynomial. It is known that Φn(X) ∈ Z[X] and is of degree
ϕ(n), the totient of n. All roots of Φn(X) form the set {ξin|i ∈ Z∗n}. In this paper,
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we will be working with a cyclotomic ring of the form R = Z[X]/Φn(X). For
any prime n, if a prime q satisfies q = 1 mod n, then Φn(X) splits into n − 1
distinct linear factors modulo q. Given n, the existence of infinite such primes
is guaranteed by Dirichlet’s theorem on arithmetic progressions. Furthermore,
by Linnik’s theorem, the smallest such q can be bounded by poly(n) (a more
precise bound O(n5.2) has been proven in [36]). Another important class of rings
involved in our discussion is the family of rings of the form Rq = R/qR. As
indicated earlier, our main focus will be prime cyclotomic rings, i.e. those rings
associate with polynomials Φn(X) = Xn−1 + Xn−2 + · · · + 1 with n a prime.
Given a positive integer n, we define the polynomial Θn(X) to be Xn − 1
if n is odd, and X
n
2 + 1 if n is even. It is easy to see that there is a natural
ring extension R′ = Z[X]/Θn(X) of the cyclotomic ring R = Z[X]/Φn(X). In
particular, when n > 1 is a power of 2, R = R′; when n is a prime, the relation
Θn(X) = Φn(X) ·(X−1) implies a ring isomorphism R′  R×Z by the Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
Hardness of RLWE. The “pure” Ring Learning With Errors problem (RLWE)
introduced in [25] involves the dual of the ring. For the ring Z[X]/(X2
m
+1), its
dual is just a scaling of itself. Therefore, many RLWE instances are established
over such rings to avoid dual. In [7], Ducas and Durmus proposed an “easy-to-
use” RLWE setting and instantiated RLWE over prime cyclotomic rings. In this
paper, we follow the setting of [7].
Definition 1 (RLWE error distribution in [7]). Let R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Given
ψ a distribution over Q[X]/Θn(X), we define ψ as the distribution over R
obtained by e = e′ mod Φn(X) ∈ R with e′ ←↩ ψ. Here we denote by f
the polynomial whose coefficients are derived by rounding coefficients of f to the
nearest integers.
Definition 2 (RLWEdistribution in [7]). Let R = Z[X]/Φn(X) and Rq =
R/qR. For s ∈ Rq and ψ a distribution over Q[X]/Θn(X), we define As,ψ as
the distribution over Rq × Rq obtained by sampling the pair (a, as + e) where
a ←↩ U(Rq) and e ←↩ ψ.
Definition 3 (RLWEq,ψ,k). Let R = Z[X]/Φn(X) and Rq = R/qR. The prob-
lem RLWEq,ψ,k in the ring R is defined as follows. Given k samples drawn from
As,ψ where s ←↩ U(Rq) and k samples from U(Rq × Rq), distinguish them with
an advantage 1/poly(n).
The following theorem indicates that RLWE under the above settings is hard
based on the worst-case hardness of γ-Ideal-SVP. The ideal lattices we dis-
cuss here are with respect to the so-called canonical embedding, i.e. θ(f) =
(f(ξin))i∈Z∗n .
Theorem 1 ([7], Theorem 2). Let n be an odd prime, and let Rq be the ring
Zq[X]/Φn(X) where q is a prime congruent to 1 modulo 2n. Also, let α ∈ (0, 1)
be a real number such that αq > ω(
√
log n). There exists a randomized quantum
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reduction from γ-Ideal-SVP on ideal lattices in Z[X]/Φn(X) to RLWEq,ψnt ,k for
t =
√
nαq
(
(n−1)k
log((n−1)k)
)1/4
(with γ = O˜
(√
n
α
)
) that runs in time O(q · poly(n)).
Let R×q be the set of all invertible elements of Rq. By restricting As,ψ to R×q ×
Rq, we obtain a modified RLWE distribution and denote it by A×s,ψ. Replacing
As,ψ and U(Rq × Rq) by A×s,ψ and U(R×q × Rq) respectively, we get a variant
of RLWE which is denoted by RLWE×. When q = Ω(n), the invertible elements
account for a non-negligible fraction in the Rq. Thus RLWE× remains hard.
Furthermore, as explained in [33], the nonce s in A×s,ψ can be sampled from ψ
without incurring security loss. We denote by RLWE×HNF this variant of RLWE
×.
3 New Results on Prime Cyclotomic Rings
In this section, we will report on a series of results on prime cyclotomic rings.
Some of the results are adapted from corresponding conclusions in [33], but the
modifications are not trivial considering the differences between the cyclotomic
rings of prime and a power of 2 orders. Firstly, we present several notations and
basic properties aiming at prime cyclotomic rings.
3.1 Notations and Properties
Let n be a prime and R be the ring Z[X]/Φn(X) = Z[X]/(Xn−1 + · · · + 1). For
any f ∈ R, we call a vector (f0, · · · , fn−2) ∈ Zn−1 the coefficient vector of f
if f =
∑n−2
i=0 fiX
i. For any s = (s1, · · · , sm) ∈ Rm, we view s as a m(n − 1)-
dimensional vector in Zm(n−1) by coefficient embedding. Given s, t ∈ Rm, their
Euclidean inner product is denoted by 〈s, t〉. To get a clean expression of 〈s, t〉
as a coefficient of a polynomial related to s and t, we introduce two operations
on f ∈ R as follows.
Let f ∈ R of coefficient vector (f0, · · · , fn−2), we define f to be the polyno-
mial
∑n−2
i=0 (
∑n−2
j=i fj)X
i and f the polynomial
∑n−3
i=0 (fi−fi+1)Xi+fn−2Xn−2,
respectively. One important consequence is that, regarding  and  as two func-
tions over R, these operations are inverse to each other, namely
Proposition 1. Let n be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X), then
∀f ∈ R, (f) = (f) = f.
Proof. Let (g0, · · · , gn−2) and (h0, · · · , hn−2) be the coefficient vectors of the
polynomials f and f respectively. According to the definitions of these two
operations, we have
gi =
n−2∑
j=i
fj for i ∈ {0, · · · , n − 2}
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and
hi = fi − fi+1 for i < n − 2 and hn−2 = fn−2.
Then, a straightforward computation leads to that
gi − gi+1 = fi for i < n − 2 and gn−2 = fn−2
and
n−2∑
j=i
hj = fi for i ∈ {0, · · · , n − 2}.
Thus we conclude that g = h = f , i.e. (f) = (f) = f . unionsq
The following lemma manifests an expression of the Euclidean inner product
of two elements in R.
Lemma 6. Let n be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Denote by X−1 the inverse
of X. Let f ∈ R of coefficient vector (f0, · · · , fn−2) and g ∈ R of coefficient
vector (g0, · · · , gn−2). Then
n−2∑
i=0
figi = the constant coefficient of the polynomial f(X)g(X−1).
Proof. Let (g′0, · · · , g′n−2) be the coefficient vector of the polynomial g. Notice
that the term Xn is equivalent to the identity element of R. Hence X−1 is
equivalent to Xn−1 when it comes to the algebraic computations over R. Then
we have
f(X)g(X−1) = f(X)g(Xn−1) =
∑
i,j∈{0,··· ,n−2}
fig
′
jX
i+(n−1)j .
The constant coefficient of f(X)g(X−1) is only contributed by the term
Xi+(n−1)j with i + (n − 1)j = 0, n − 1 mod n, i.e. i = j or j − 1. Note that
Xn−1 = −(Xn−2 + · · · + 1), thus the constant coefficient of f(X)g(X−1)
equals
∑n−2
i=0 fig
′
i −
∑n−3
i=0 fig
′
i+1 =
∑n−3
i=0 fi(g
′
i − g′i+1) + fn−2g′n−2. The terms
{g′i − g′i+1}n−3i=0 and g′n−2 are the coefficients of the polynomial (g) = g. Con-
sequently, the constant coefficient of f(X)g(X−1) equals
∑n−2
i=0 figi. unionsq
Corollary 1. Let n be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). For any s =
(s1, · · · , sm) ∈ Rm and t = (t1, · · · , tm) ∈ Rm, then
〈s, t〉 = the constant coefficient of the polynomial
m∑
i=1
si(X)t

i (X
−1).
Remark. For the ring Z[X]/(Xn + 1), the Euclidean inner product of any two
elements f and g equals the constant coefficient of the polynomial f(X)g(X−1),
which is simpler than the case in our discussion. The rather involved expression
of Euclidean inner product contributes to a sequence of technical differences
compared to that in [33].
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Now we introduce several norms and demonstrate some relations among
them. For any t ∈ R, we define its T2-norm by T2(t)2 =
∑n−1
i=1 |t(ξin)|2 and
its algebraic norm by N(t) =
∏n−1
i=1 |t(ξin)|. Also we define the polynomial norm
‖t‖ by the Euclidean norm of the coefficient vector of t.
Lemma 7. Let n be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). For any t ∈ R, we have
N(t)
2
n−1 ≤ 1
n − 1T2(t)
2 and ‖t‖2 = T2(t)
2 + t(1)2
n
≥ T2(t)
2
n
.
Proof. The first inequality can be proven directly by arithmetic-geometric
inequality. Since ‖t‖2 =
∑n−1
i=0 |t(ξin)|2
n =
T2(t)
2+t(1)2
n is the Parseval’s identity
[35], the second one follows immediately, as t(1)2 ≥ 0. unionsq
Moreover, we present the following result to illustrate that the product of
two polynomials in R is of well-bounded norm.
Lemma 8. Let n be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). For any f, g ∈ R, we have
‖fg‖∞ ≤ 2‖f‖‖g‖ and ‖fg‖ ≤ 2
√
n − 1‖f‖‖g‖.
Proof. Let R′ = Z[X]/(Xn − 1) and f ′, g′ ∈ R′ be the polynomials with the
same coefficients as f, g respectively, i.e. the coefficients of Xn−1 are 0. Let h′ =∑n−1
i=0 h
′
iX
i be the product of f ′ and g′ in R′ where h′i ∈ Z for i ∈ {0, · · · , n − 1}.
Let h = f · g ∈ R. Notice that Φn(X) is a factor of Xn − 1, hence we know that
h′ mod Φn(X) = h ∈ R, i.e. h = h′ mod Φn(X) =
∑n−2
i=0 (h
′
i − h′n−1)Xi.
Let (f0, · · · , fn−2) and (g0, · · · , gn−2) be the coefficient vectors of f and
g. We also set fn−1 = gn−1 = 0. For any i ∈ {0, · · · , n − 1}, we have
h′i =
∑n−1
j=0 fjg(i−j) mod n. By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we know that |h′i| ≤
‖f‖‖g‖. Therefore
‖h‖∞ = max
0≤i≤n−2
|h′i − h′n−1| ≤ max
0≤i≤n−2
(|h′i| + |h′n−1|) ≤ 2‖f‖‖g‖.
By equivalence of norms, we conclude that ‖h‖ ≤ √n − 1‖h‖∞ ≤
2
√
n − 1‖f‖‖g‖. unionsq
Remark. The second inequality indicates that an upper bound of the multiplica-
tive expansion factor of R, which is γ×(R) = maxf,g∈R ‖fg‖‖f‖‖g‖ , is 2
√
n − 1. This
is comparable to that of power-of-2 cyclotomic rings in the asymptotic sense, as
the expansion factor of the ring Z[X]/(Xn + 1) is exactly
√
n (see [13]).
3.2 Duality Results for Module Lattices
In [33], Stehle´ and Steinfeld reveals a nice duality between two module lattices
for the n-th cyclotomic ring with n a power of 2. However, that duality cannot be
simply generalized to the case of prime cyclotomic rings. Next, we will propose
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a new duality relationship between two module lattices for a prime cyclotomic
ring.
To begin with, we introduce a few families of R-modules. Let q be a prime
such that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and Rq =
R/qR. We denote by {φi}i=1,··· ,n−1 all roots of Φn(X) modulo q. Note that if φ
is a root of Φn(X) modulo q, then so is φ−1 mod q. By the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, we see that
Rq  Zq[X]/(X − φ1) × · · · × Zq[X]/(X − φn−1)  (Zq)n−1.
From this, we see that each ideal of Rq is of the form
∏
i∈S(X − φi) · Rq with
S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1}, and we denote it by IS . Let R×q be the set of all invertible
elements of Rq. Given a ∈ Rmq , we define two R-modules a⊥(IS) and L(a, IS)
in exactly the same manner as in [33]:
a⊥(IS) :=
{
(t1, · · · , tm) ∈ Rm| ∀i, (ti mod q) ∈ IS and
m∑
i=1
tiai = 0 mod q
}
,
L(a, IS) := {(t1, · · · , tm) ∈ Rm| ∃s ∈ Rq,∀i, (ti mod q) = ai · s mod IS} .
Then we can define a new R-module L(a, IS) to be
L(a, IS) :=
{
(t1, · · · , tm) ∈ Rm|(t1 , · · · , tm) ∈ L(a, IS)
}
.
Module lattices a⊥(IS) and L(a, IS) can be related by duality argument.
More precisely,
Lemma 9. Let n be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Let q be a prime such that
Φn(X) splits into n− 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and Rq = R/qR. Given
S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1} and a ∈ Rmq , let a× ∈ Rmq be defined by a×i = ai(X−1)
and I×
S¯
be the ideal
∏
i∈S¯(X − φ−1i ) · Rq where S¯ is the complement of S. Then
(considering both sets as m(n − 1)-dimensional lattices by identifying R with
Z
n−1)
â⊥(IS) =
1
q
L(a×, I×
S¯
).
Proof. Firstly, we prove that 1qL(a×, I×S¯ ) ⊆ â⊥(IS). For any t = (t1, · · · , tm) ∈
a⊥(IS) and t′ = (t′1, · · · , t′m) ∈ L(a×, I×S¯ ), Corollary 1 says that
their inner product 〈t, t′〉 equals the constant coefficient of the polynomial∑m
i=1 ti(X)t
′
i (X
−1). According to the definition of L(a×, I×
S¯
) and Proposi-
tion 1, there exists s ∈ Rq such that (t′i mod q) = a×i · s + b′i for some b′i ∈ I×S¯ .
Then we get
m∑
i=1
ti(X)t
′
i (X
−1) = s(X−1) ·
m∑
i=1
ti(X)ai(X) +
m∑
i=1
ti(X)b′i(X
−1) mod q
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Both two sums in the right hand side evaluate to 0 in Rq, which means that
〈t, t′〉 = 0 mod q. Therefore, we finish the proof of this part.
Secondly, it suffices to prove that ̂L(a×, I×
S¯
) ⊆ 1qa⊥(IS). For any
t ∈ L(a×, I×
S¯
) and t′ ∈ ̂L(a×, I×
S¯
), the constant coefficient of
∑m
i=1 t
′
i(X)t

i (X
−1) = 〈t′, t〉 is an integer due to duality. Notice that if
(t1, · · · , tm) ∈ L(a×, I×S¯ ), then
(
(t1 · Xk), · · · , (tm · Xk)
)
∈ L(a×, I×
S¯
).
Thus, for k ∈ {1, · · · , n − 2}, the constant coefficient of ∑mi=1 t′i(X)ti (X−1)X−k
is also an integer, which implies that all coefficients of
∑m
i=1 t
′
i(X)t

i (X
−1)
are integers. For any (t1, · · · , tm) ∈ ̂L(a×, I×S¯ ), we deduce from the fact
(q, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ L(a×, I×
S¯
) that qt1 ∈ Zn−1. Let νI×
S¯
be the poly-
nomial
∏
i∈S¯(X − φ−1i ). Since
(
ν
I×
S¯
, 0, · · · , 0
)
∈ L(a×, I×
S¯
), we obtain
qt1(X) · νI×
S¯
(X−1) = 0 mod Rq, that means (qt1 mod q) ∈ IS . For the
same reason, we have (qti mod q) ∈ IS for any i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. If we set
s = 1, then (a×1 , · · · , a×m ) ∈ L(a×, I×S¯ ). It shows that the polynomial∑m
i=1 (qti(X)ai(X)) = q
∑m
i=1
(
ti(X)a×i (X
−1)
)
= 0 mod q. Combining the fact
that (qti mod q) ∈ IS , we conclude that q(t1, · · · , tm) ∈ a⊥(IS). The proof is
completed. unionsq
Remark. The above result on the duality is different from that proven in [33],
because the inner product has a more involved form. The original ideas of [33]
have been exploited here, but we also add more details to treat technical differ-
ences.
3.3 On the Absence of Unusually Short Vector in L(a, IS)
We now show that for a ←↩ U((R×q )m), the first minimum of L(a, IS) for
the ∞ norm is overwhelming unlikely unusually small. First we observe that
the lattice L(a, IS) is transformed from the lattice L(a, IS). To describe the
transformation, we define a matrix H ∈ Zm(n−1)×m(n−1) as
H =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
1
−1 1
−1 . . .
. . . 1
−1 1
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⊗ Idm,
where Idm is an m-dimensional identity matrix. Let B ∈ Zm(n−1)×m(n−1) be a
basis of L(a, IS) whose rows correspond to the basis vectors, then B′ = B ·H is
a basis of L(a, IS). It is thus easy to see that L(a, IS) and L(a, IS) are of the
same volume, i.e. det
(L(a, IS)
)
= det (L(a, IS)) = q(m−1)|S|. This is because
there are qm(n−1−|S|)+|S| points of L(a, IS) in the cube [0, q−1]m(n−1). Also, the
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first minimums of these two lattices may not have a significant difference. Hence
we first present a result on L(a, IS) which is a variant on prime cyclotomic rings
of Lemma 8 in [33].
Lemma 10. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Let q be a prime such
that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and Rq = R/qR.
For any S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1}, m ≥ 2 and  > 0, set
β := 1− 1
m
+
1 −
√
1 + 4m(m − 1)
(
1 − |S|
n−1
)
+ 4m
2m
≥ 1− 1
m
−−(m−1)
(
1 − |S|
n − 1
)
,
then we have λ∞1 (L(a, IS)) ≥ 1√nqβ with probability ≥ 1 − 2
n−1
(q−1)(n−1) over the
uniformly random choice of a in (R×q )m.
Remark. The above lemma can be shown by following the original idea but
with some slight modifications on the inequalities for different norms in prime
cyclotomic rings. For completeness, we give a proof in AppendixA. It is also
noted that our statement of the lemma is essentially the same as that in Lemma
8 of [33], this is primarily because there is a simple relation for the Euclidean
and algebraic norms in both prime and power-of-2 cyclotomic rings.
Next, we shall show that the first minimum λ∞1 (L(a, IS)) is at most n2 times
that of L(a, IS).
Lemma 11. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Let q be a prime such
that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and Rq = R/qR.
Then, for any a ∈ (R×q )m and S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1}, we have
λ∞1 (L(a, IS)) ≤
n − 1
2
λ∞1 (L(a, IS)).
Proof. We first show that ‖X n−12 t‖∞ ≤ n−12 ‖t‖∞ for any t ∈ R. Let
(t0, · · · , tn−2) be the coefficient vector of t. We denote by (t0 , · · · , tn−2) and
(t′0, · · · , t′n−2) the coefficient vectors of the polynomials t and X
n−1
2 t, then:
t′i =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
tn+1
2 +i
− tn−1
2
, i < n−32
−tn−1
2
, i = n−32
t
i− n−12
− tn−1
2
, i > n−32
.
From ti =
∑n−2
j=i tj , we get
t′i =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
−∑
n−1
2 +i
j= n−12
tj , i <
n−3
2
−∑n−2
j= n−12
tj , i = n−32
∑n−3
2
j=i− n−12
tj , i >
n−3
2
.
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Notice that each t′i is a sum of consecutive tj ’s of length at most
n−1
2 , thus
‖X n−12 t‖∞ = maxi |t′i| ≤ n−12 maxi |ti| = n−12 ‖t‖∞ holds.
For any s = (s1, · · · , sm) ∈ L(a, IS), the vector s = (s1 , · · · , sm) belongs
to L(a, IS) and thus the vector s′ =
(
X
n−1
2 s1 , · · · ,X
n−1
2 sm
)
is also in L(a, IS).
Then
‖s′‖∞ = max
i
‖X n−12 si ‖∞ ≤
n − 1
2
max
i
‖si‖∞ = n − 12 ‖s‖∞.
Since there exists a unique s ∈ L(a, IS) such that r = s for any r ∈ L(a, IS),
we conclude that λ∞1 (L(a, IS)) ≤ n−12 λ∞1 (L(a, IS)). unionsq
Lemmata 10 and 11 lead to the following result on L(a, IS) immediately.
Lemma 12. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Let q be a prime such
that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and Rq = R/qR.
For any S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1}, m ≥ 2 and  > 0, set
β := 1− 1
m
+
1 −
√
1 + 4m(m − 1)
(
1 − |S|
n−1
)
+ 4m
2m
≥ 1− 1
m
−−(m−1)
(
1 − |S|
n − 1
)
,
then we have λ∞1 (L(a, IS)) ≥ 2(n−1)√nqβ with probability ≥ 1− 2
n−1
(q−1)(n−1) over
the uniformly random choice of a in (R×q )m.
3.4 Results on Regularity
Let Dχ be the distribution of the tuple (a1, · · · , am,
∑m
i=1 tiai) ∈ (R×q )m × Rq
with ai’s being independent and uniformly random in R×q and ti’s being sam-
pled from the distribution χ over Rq. We call the statistical distance between
Dχ and the uniform distribution over (R×q )m ×Rq the regularity of the general-
ized knapsack function (t1, · · · , tm) →
∑m
i=1 tiai. In [27], Micciancio gave some
results on regularity for general finite rings and constructed a class of one-way
functions. In [33], an improved result was claimed for the ring Z[X]/(Xn + 1)
with n a power of 2 and a Gaussian distribution χ.
We can derive the result of the regularity for prime cyclotomic rings. It pro-
vides a foundation of security for more cryptographic primitives based on prime
cyclotomic rings. In the later part, we will concentrate on NTRU applications
corresponding to the case m = 2.
Lemma 13. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Let q be a prime
such that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and Rq =
R/qR. Let S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1}, m ≥ 2,  > 0, δ ∈ (0, 12 ), c ∈ Rm(n−1) and
t ←↩ DZm(n−1),r,c, with r ≥ n−12
√
n ln(2m(n−1)(1+1/δ))
π · q
1
m +(m−1) |S|n−1+. Then for
all except a fraction ≤ 2n−1
(q−1)(n−1) of a ∈ (R×q )m, we have
Δ
(
t mod a⊥(IS);U(Zm(n−1)/a⊥(IS))
)
≤ 2δ.
Provably Secure NTRU Instances over Prime Cyclotomic Rings 421
In particular, for all except a fraction ≤ 2n−1(q − 1)−(n−1) of a ∈ (R×q )m, we
have ∣
∣
∣DZm(n−1),r,c(a
⊥(IS)) − q−(n−1)−(m−1)|S|
∣
∣
∣ ≤ 2δ.
Proof. By combining Lemmata 2, 4, 9 and 12, the first part follows.
For a ∈ (R×q )m, the lattice a⊥(IS) is of the volume det
(
a⊥(IS)
)
=
det
(
1
qL(a×, I×S¯ )
)−1
= qm(n−1)/q(m−1)(n−1−|S|) = qn−1+(m−1)|S|. Notice that
|Zm(n−1)/a⊥(IS)| = det
(
a⊥(IS)
)
, thus we complete the proof of the second
part. unionsq
Remark. Our regularity result is under the coefficient embedding. We have also
considered the canonical embedding and generalized some results of [26]. In the
latter case, for δ = q−n with  ∈ (0, 1), the polynomial factor of the lower
bound of required width gets reduced to O(n1.5) from O(n2) in Lemma 13 and
the power exponent can also be slightly smaller. However, our key result, which
is Theorem2 in next section, requires the parameter δ in Lemma13 to be very
small. Under the canonical embedding and with δ = q−n−n, a desired result
similar to the lemma is not currently available. Thus we only work with the
coefficient embedding in this paper and leave the relevant results for our next
work.
3.5 Bounded Gap of Ideal Lattices
Let I be an ideal of the n-th cyclotomic ring and LI be the ideal lattice corre-
sponding to I (under the coefficient embedding). For the case that n is a power
of 2, one has λϕ(n)(LI) = λ1(LI). For n being a prime, however, we do not know
whether this nice property hold or not, but we are able to show that the gap
between λn−1(LI) and λ1(LI) is bounded by
√
n.
Lemma 14. Let n be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). For any non-zero ideal I
of R, we have:
λn−1(LI) ≤
√
n · λ1(LI).
Proof. Let a = (a0, · · · , an−2) be a non-zero shortest vector of LI and a ∈ R be
the polynomial of coefficient vector a. Then the polynomial Xk · a also induces
a vector of LI denoted by a(k) =
(
a
(k)
0 , · · · , a(k)n−2
)
. For any k ∈ {1, · · · , n − 2},
the coordinates of a(k) can be represented by the ai’s as follows:
a
(k)
i =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
an−k+i − an−1−k, i < k − 1
−an−1−k, i = k − 1
ai−k − an−1−k, i > k − 1
.
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Then, we have
‖a(k)‖ =
√√
√
√
n−2∑
i=0
a2i − 2an−1−k(
∑
i=n−1−k
ai) + (n − 2)a2n−1−k
≤
√√
√
√
n−2∑
i=0
a2i + (n − 1)a2n−1−k + (
∑
i=n−1−k
ai)2
≤
√√
√
√
n−2∑
i=0
a2i + (n − 1)a2n−1−k + (n − 2)(
∑
i=n−1−k
a2i )
≤ √n · ‖a‖.
All these a(k)’s and a are linearly independent so that we conclude that
λn−1(LIS ) ≤
√
n · λ1(LIS ). unionsq
Back to the ring Rq, combining Minkowski’s theorem, we obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Let q be a prime such
that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and Rq = R/qR.
Let S ⊆ {1, · · · , n − 1} and denote by LIS the lattice generated by the ideal
〈q,∏i∈S(X − φi)〉. Then
λn−1(LIS ) ≤
√
n · λ1(LIS ) ≤ n · q
|S|
n−1 .
4 Revised NTRUEncrypt over Prime Cyclotomic Rings
In this section, we will describe a variant of NTRUEncrypt over prime cyclotomic
rings with provable security under the worst-case hardness assumption. The
revised NTRUEncrypt is determined by parameters n, q, p, r, α, k and denoted
by NTRUEncrypt(n, q, p, r, α, k). First, we choose a prime n ≥ 7 and let R be
the ring Z[X]/Φn(X). Then we pick a prime q = 1 mod n so that Φn(X) =∏n−1
i=1 (X − φi) mod q with distinct φi’s, and let Rq = R/qR. The parameter
p ∈ R×q is chosen to be of small norm, such as p = 2, 3 or p = x+2. The parameter
r is the width of discrete Gaussian distribution used for key generation. The
parameters α and k are used for RLWE error generation. We list below three
main components of NTRUEncrypt(n, q, p, r, α, k):
– Key Generation. Sample f ′ from DZn−1,r; if f = pf ′ + 1 mod q /∈ R×q ,
resample. Sample g from DZn−1,r; if g mod q /∈ R×q , resample. Then return
private key sk = f ∈ R×q with f = 1 mod p and public key pk = h = pg/f ∈
R×q .
– Encryption. Given message M ∈ R/pR, let t = √nαq
(
(n−1)k
log((n−1)k)
)1/4
, set
s, e ←↩ ψnt and return ciphertext C = hs + pe + M ∈ Rq.
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– Decryption. Given ciphertext C and private key f , compute C ′ = f · C mod
q and return C ′ mod p.
Next we explain when and why the scheme works and how to assess its
security.
4.1 Key Generation
In the above key generation algorithm, we generate the polynomials f and g
by using a discrete Gaussian sampler. Lemma 5 provides a sampler outputting
a distribution within exponentially small statistical distance to a certain dis-
crete Gaussian. Actually, the conditions in our results are more demanding than
that in Lemma 5. Ignoring the negligible impact, we assume we already have a
polynomial-time perfect discrete Gaussian sampler.
To ensure both f and g are invertible modulo q, we may need to resample
quite a few times. The following result indicates that the key generation algo-
rithm terminates in expected polynomial time for some selective parameters.
Lemma 15. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Let q be a prime such
that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and Rq = R/qR.
For any δ ∈ (0, 1/2), let r ≥ n
√
ln(2(n−1)(1+1/δ))
π · q1/(n−1). Then
Pr
f ′←↩D
Zn−1,r
(
(p · f ′ + a mod q) /∈ R×q
) ≤ (n − 1)(1
q
+ 2δ)
holds for a ∈ R and p ∈ R×q .
Proof. It suffices to bound the probability that p·f ′+a belongs to I := 〈q,X−φk〉
by (1/q + 2δ) for any k ≤ n − 1. First we have λn−1(LI) ≤ nq 1n−1 by Corollary
2 since the ideal I corresponds to I{k}. This, together with Lemma 1, implies
that r ≥ ηδ(LI). Applying Lemma 4, we have that the probability of p · f ′ + a =
0 mod I does not exceed 1/q + 2δ. unionsq
Next, we claim that the norms of f and g are small with overwhelming
probability.
Lemma 16. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Suppose q > 8n is
a prime such that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and
Rq = R/qR. Let r ≥ n
√
2 ln(6(n−1))
π · q1/(n−1). The secret key polynomials f , g
satisfy, with probability ≥ 1 − 2−n+4,
‖f‖ ≤ 2n‖p‖r and ‖g‖ ≤ √n − 1r.
If deg p = 0, then ‖f‖ ≤ 2√n − 1 · ‖p‖r with probability ≥ 1 − 2−n+4.
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Proof. Setting δ = 110(n−1)−1 , then we get r ≥
√
ln(2(n−1)(1+1/δ))
π from the
assumption. Applying Lemma 1 to Zn−1, we know that r ≥ ηδ(Zn−1). Therefore,
we can use Lemma 3 to get,
Pr
g←↩D
Zn−1,r
(‖g‖ ≥ r√n − 1) ≤ 1 + δ
1 − δ 2
1−n.
Since r ≥ n
√
ln(2(n−1)(1+1/δ))
π · q1/(n−1), Lemma 15 yields
Pr
g←↩D
Zn−1,r
(‖g‖ ≥ r√n − 1 | g ∈ R×q
) ≤
Prg←↩D
Zn−1,r
(‖g‖ ≥ r√n − 1)
Prg←↩D
Zn−1,r
(
g ∈ R×q
)
≤ 1 + δ
1 − δ 2
1−n · 1
1 − (n − 1)(1/q + 2δ) ≤ 2
4−n.
This means that the norm of the key polynomial g is less than r
√
n − 1 with
probability ≥1−24−n. The same argument holds true for the polynomial f ′ such
that f = p · f ′ + 1.
If deg p = 0, we have ‖f‖ ≤ 1 + ‖p‖‖f ′‖ ≤ 2‖p‖r√n − 1 with probability
≥1 − 24−n. For general cases, applying Lemma 8, we know that ‖f‖ ≤ 1 +
‖p‖‖f ′‖ ≤ 1 + 2(n − 1)‖p‖r ≤ 2n · ‖p‖r with probability ≥1 − 24−n. unionsq
We are also able to prove that the public key h, the ratio of pg and f = pf ′+1,
enjoys a favorable uniformity for some well-chosen r’s, just like that shown in
[33]. We denote by D×r,z the discrete Gaussian DZn−1,r restricted to R×q + z.
Theorem 2. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Suppose q > 8n is
a prime such that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q and
Rq = R/qR. Let 0 <  < 12 and r ≥ (n − 1)2
√
ln(8nq) · q 12+2. Then
Δ
(
y1 + p · D×r,z1
y2 + p · D×r,z2
mod q;U(R×q )
)
≤ 2
3(n−1)
q(n−1)
for p ∈ R×q , yi ∈ Rq and zi = −yip−1 mod q for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Remark. Our proof follows essentially the same approach as in [33]. For com-
pleteness, we include it in Appendix B. This result provides a new instance of
Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio (DSPR) assumption introduced in [24].
4.2 Decryption
Just like in the classical NTRUEncrypt, the correctness of decryption is based
on the fact that a polynomial of ∞ norm < q/2 is invariant under modulo q
reduction. In our decryption procedure, we have C ′ = f · C = pgs + pfe +
fM mod q. When ‖pgs + pfe + fM‖∞ < q2 , C ′ is in fact pgs + pfe + fM and
hence C ′ mod p = fM mod p = M due to f = 1 mod p, i.e. the decryption
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succeeds. Now we are to confirm that, given a set of proper parameters, the ∞
norms of pgs, pfe and fM will be small enough (e.g., less than q6 ) with high
probability. This ensures a successful decryption.
We first show that the polynomial drawn from RLWE error distribution has
a relatively small norm with a high probability.
Lemma 17. Let n ≥ 7 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). For t > 1 and u > 0,
we have
Pr
b←↩ψnt
(
‖b‖ ≥
(√
2n(
√
u + 2)
)
t
)
≤ exp(−u).
Proof. We will need the following inequality in our proof:
x2 ≤ 1
4
+
1
1 − x
2.
In fact, for x ∈ R, we have (x − x)2 ≤ 14 . For any  ∈ (0, 1), we have x2 ≤
1
4 − x2 + 2xx ≤ 14 − x2 + 11−x2 + (1 − )x2 = 14 + 1−x2 + (1 − )x2. A
routine computation leads to the result.
Let b = b′ mod Φn(X) ∈ R with b′ ←↩ ψnt . Let vector v = 1t (b0, · · · , bn−1)
where (b0, · · · , bn−1) is the coefficient vector of b′. Then we obtain
‖b‖2 ≤ 1
1 − 
n−2∑
i=0
(bi − bn−1)2 + n − 14 =
t2
1 − ‖Mv‖
2 +
n − 1
4
,
where
M =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
1 −1
1 −1
. . .
...
1 −1
0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
∈ Rn×n.
Let Σ = MM, we have
Σ =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
1 −1
1 −1
. . .
...
1 −1
−1 −1 · · · −1 (n − 1)
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
∈ Rn×n.
In our estimation, we need traces tr(Σ), tr(Σ2) and the operator norm ‖Σ‖.
It is easy to check that tr(Σ) = 2(n − 1), tr(Σ2) = (n − 1)(n + 2). It can be
calculated that the characteristic polynomial of Σ is λ(λ− 1)n−2(λ− n), so n is
the largest eigenvalue of Σ and hence ‖Σ‖ = n.
All coordinates of b′ follow the distribution ψt independently, so the coor-
dinates of v follow standard Gaussian independently. As shown in [20], an tail
bound for ‖Mv‖2 holds
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Pr
(
‖Mv‖2 > 2(n − 1) + 2
√
(n − 1)(n + 2)u + 2nu
)
=Pr
(
‖Mv‖2 > tr (Σ) + 2
√
tr (Σ2)u + 2‖Σ‖u
)
≤ exp(−u).
Let
 =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝1 +
√√
√
√4t2
(
2(n − 1) + 2√(n − 1)(n + 2)u + 2nu
)
n − 1
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
−1
∈ (0, 1)
and
A =
√
2(n − 1) + 2√(n − 1)(n + 2)u + 2nu
1 −  +
n − 1
4t2
.
Then it can be verified that
A =
√
2(n − 1) + 2
√
(n − 1)(n + 2)u + 2nu +
√
n − 1
4t2
<
√
2n(
√
u + 2),
thus we have
Pr
b←↩ψnt
(
‖b‖ ≥
(√
2n(
√
u + 2)
)
t
)
≤ Pr
b←↩ψnt
(‖b‖ > At)
≤ Pr
v←↩ψn1
(
1
1 − ‖Mv‖
2 +
n − 1
4t2
> A2
)
=Pr
(
‖Mv‖2 > 2(n − 1) + 2
√
(n − 1)(n + 2)u + 2nu
)
≤ exp(−u). unionsq
Setting u in Lemma17 to Θ(log1+κ n) and applying Lemmata 8 and 16, we
are able to get the following:
Lemma 18. In NTRUEncrypt(n, q, p, r, α, k), let t =
√
nαq
(
(n−1)k
log((n−1)k)
)1/4
>
1. Then for κ > 0, we have
‖pgs‖∞, ‖pfe‖∞ ≤ 8
√
2n2Θ
(
log
1+κ
2 n
)
‖p‖2rt
with probability at least 1 − n−Θ(logκ n).
Furthermore, if deg p = 0, then
‖pgs‖∞, ‖pfe‖∞ ≤ 4
√
2nΘ
(
log
1+κ
2 n
)
‖p‖2rt
with probability at least 1 − n−Θ(logκ n).
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It is also hoped that fM has smaller norm. Indeed, we can prove
Lemma 19. In NTRUEncrypt(n, q, p, r, α, k), we have
1. ‖M‖ ≤ (n − 1)‖p‖.
2. ‖fM‖∞ ≤ 4n2‖p‖2r with probability at least 1 − 2−n+4.
Furthermore, if deg p = 0, we have ‖M‖ ≤
√
n−1
2 ‖p‖ holds, and with probability
at least 1 − 2−n+4, ‖fM‖∞ ≤ 2n‖p‖2r holds.
Proof. By reducing modulo the pXi’s, we can write M into
∑n−2
i=0 ipX
i with
−1/2 < i ≤ 1/2. Using Lemma 8, we have
‖M‖ ≤ 2√n − 1‖
n−2∑
i=0
iX
i‖‖p‖ ≤ (n − 1)‖p‖.
For the case deg p = 0, we have ‖M‖ = ‖p‖ · ‖∑n−2i=0 iXi‖ ≤
√
n−1
2 ‖p‖. Then,
combining Lemmata 8 and 16 with the above result, the proof is completed. unionsq
Overall, we give a set of parameters such that NTRUEncrypt decrypts cor-
rectly with high probability.
Theorem 3. If ω
(
n2 log0.5 n
) ‖p‖2rt/q < 1(resp. ω (n log0.5 n) ‖p‖2rt/q < 1 if
deg p = 0) and t =
√
nαq
(
(n−1)k
log((n−1)k)
)1/4
> 1, then the decryption algorithm of
NTRUEncrypt recovers M with probability 1−n−ω(1) over the choice of s, e, f, g.
4.3 Security Reduction and Parameters
In a manner similar to [33], we are able to establish a security reduction of
NTRUEncrypt from the decisional RLWE×HNF . One technical idea is that one can
produce a legal pair of public key and ciphertext pair (h = pa,C = pb + M =
hs+ pe+M) by using the pair (a, b = as+ e) sampled from RLWE distribution.
The proof of Lemma 20 is shown in Appendix C.
Lemma 20. Let n ≥ 8 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Suppose q > 8n
is a prime such that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo q
and Rq = R/qR. Let , δ > 0, p ∈ R×q , t =
√
nαq
(
(n−1)k
log((n−1)k)
)1/4
, and r ≥
(n − 1)2√ln(8nq) · q 12+. If there exists an IND-CPA attack against the variant
of NTRUEncrypt that runs in time T and has success probability 1/2 + δ, then
there exists an algorithm solving RLWEq,ψ,k with ψ = ψnt that runs in time
T ′ = T + O(kn) and has success probability 12 + δ
′ where δ′ = δ2 − q−Ω(n).
Now we integrate all above results and discuss the parameter requirements.
To ensure the uniformity of public keys, the parameters r, n and q should sat-
isfy the condition claimed in Theorem 2, i.e. r ≥ (n − 1)2√ln(8nq) · q 12+2
for 0 <  < 12 . To ensure a high probability of success decryption, we need
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that t =
√
nαq
(
(n−1)k
log((n−1)k)
)1/4
> 1 and ω
(
n2 log0.5 n
) ‖p‖2rt/q < 1 (resp.
ω
(
n log0.5 n
) ‖p‖2rt/q < 1 if deg p = 0) as stated in Theorem 3. To satisfy
the condition of RLWE (Theorem 1), it requires that αq > ω(
√
log n). From
these requirements, to obtain a variant of NTRUEncrypt with provable security
against IND-CPA attack, we may set main parameters as follows.
– q = poly(n),  ∈ (0, 12
)
, and q
1
2− = ω
(
n4.75 log1.5 n‖p‖2),
– r = n2
√
ln(8nq) · q 12+,
– k = O(1), αq = Ω(log0.75 n) and t =
√
nαq
(
(n−1)k
log((n−1)k)
)1/4
=
Ω(n0.75 log0.5 n).
If p is set to be an integer (i.e. deg p = 0) which is a most routine case used
in NTRUEncrypt scheme, the parameters may be relaxed:
– q = poly(n),  ∈ (0, 12
)
, and q
1
2− = ω
(
n3.75 log1.5 n‖p‖2),
– r = n2
√
ln(8nq) · q 12+,
– k = O(1), αq = Ω(log0.75 n) and t =
√
nαq
(
(n−1)k
log((n−1)k)
)1/4
=
Ω(n0.75 log0.5 n).
Combining with Theorem1, we have obtained our main result.
Theorem 4. Let n ≥ 8 be a prime and R = Z[X]/Φn(X). Suppose q = poly(n)
is a prime such that Φn(X) splits into n − 1 distinct linear factors modulo
q and q
1
2− = ω
(
n4.75 log1.5 n‖p‖2) (resp. q 12− = ω (n3.75 log1.5 n‖p‖2), if
deg p = 0), for arbitrary  ∈ (0, 12
)
and p ∈ R×q . Let r = n2
√
ln(8nq) · q 12+
and t =
√
nαq
(
(n−1)k
log((n−1)k)
)1/4
where k = O(1) and αq = Ω(log0.75 n). If there
exists an IND-CPA attack against the variant of NTRUEncrypt(n, q, p, r, α, k) that
runs in time poly(n) and has success probability 12 +
1
poly(n) , then there exists
a poly(n)-time algorithm solving γ-Ideal-SVP on ideal lattices in Z[X]/Φn(X)
with γ = O
(√
nq/ log0.75 n
)
. Moreover, the decryption success probability exceeds
1 − n−ω(1) over the choice of the encryption randomness.
In the modified NTRUEncrypt, the parameter r is Ω˜(n2 · q 12+) and that in
[33] is Ω˜(n · q 12+). Note tha the term q 12+ is much greater than its polynomial
coefficient n2 or n, thus, in this sense, our result is close to that for power-
of-2 cyclotomic rings. By setting  = o(1) and p to be of degree 0, the smallest
modulus q and approximate factor γ reach Ω˜(n7.5) and Ω˜(n8) respectively. These
compare to Ω˜(n5) and Ω˜(n5.5) for NTRUEncrypt over power-of-2 cyclotomic
rings.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we extended the provable security of an NTRU variant, originally
proposed by Stehle´ and Steinfeld for power-of-2 cyclotomic rings, to the family
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of prime cyclotomic rings. As this class of rings is closer to the original NTRU
rings, the results here may bring a new security estimation for the original NTRU
settings. We also developed a series of tools for prime cyclotomic rings that
provide a foundation to generalize more cryptosystems to this class of rings.
These tools might be of some independent interest.
We present a theoretical construction with suggested parameters in the
asymptotic sense. There are a batch of cryptanalyses work aiming at NTRU,
such as hybrid attack [19], subfield attack [1] and straightforward attack [22].
Detailed analyses of our NTRU variant against these attacks should be well-
considered. Furthermore, the operations over the rings Z[X]/(Xn ± 1) are still
more efficient than that over prime cyclotomic rings. The further investigation
of the relation between the prime cyclotomic ring and NTRU ring may improve
the efficiency of related cryptosystems. We leave them to the future work.
As shown in [25,26], canonical embedding provides a neat description of the
geometry of cyclotomic rings, which may lead to more compact and general
results. To get similar conclusions with respect to the canonical embedding, we
need to develop more powerful tools and that is left as a future investigation.
The ideal lattices (under the coefficient embedding) over prime cyclotomic
rings are not (anti-)circulant, thus to study the gap between their minimums
could be useful in cryptanalysis. Another interesting problem is a finer estimation
of Euclidean norm of elements in an ideal of the prime cyclotomic ring, as it is
useful in reducing some complexity estimations.
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nese Academy of Sciences (No. XDB01010600) and NSF of China (No. 61502269).
A Proof of Lemma 10
Let p be the probability over the randomness of a that λ∞1 (L(a, IS)) < B,
where B = 1√
n
qβ . For a non-zero vector t of ∞ norm < B and s ∈ Rq/IS , let
p(t, s) = Pra(∀i, ti = ais mod IS) and pi(ti, s) = Prai(ti = ais mod IS), then we
have p(t, s) =
∏m
i=1 pi(ti, s).
Let νIS be the polynomial
∏
i∈S(X − φi). We only need to consider such
(t, s) pairs that gcd(ti, νIS ) = gcd(s, νIS ) for all i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}: if not so, we
can prove p(t, s) = 0 due to the invertibility of ai. For each such pair, we denote
by d the degree of gcd(s, νIS ). Notice that there are (q − 1)d+n−1−|S| distinct
ai’s in R×q such that ti = ais mod IS , i.e. pi(ti, s) = (q − 1)d−|S|, then we have
p(t, s) =
∏m
i=1 pi(ti, s) = (q − 1)m(d−|S|).
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The probability p is bounded by
p ≤
∑
s∈Rq/IS
∑
0<‖t‖∞<B
p(t, s)
≤
∑
0≤d≤|S|
∑
S′⊆S,|S′|=d
h=
∏
i∈S′ (X−φi)
∑
s∈Rq/IS
h|s
∑
t∈Rmq
∀i,0<‖ti‖∞<B
h|ti
(q − 1)m(d−|S|).
For h =
∏
i∈S′(X − φi) of degree d, let N(B, d) be the number of t ∈ Rq such
that ‖t‖∞ ∈ (0, B) and t = ht′ for t′ ∈ Rq of degree < n − 1 − d. We now show
two bounds for N(B, d) depending on d.
Suppose that d ≥ β(n − 1), then N(B, d) = 0. Indeed, for any t = ht′ with
t′ ∈ Rq, the ideal 〈t〉 is a full-rank sub-ideal of the ideal 〈h, q〉. Thus, we have
N(t) = N(〈t〉) ≥ N(〈h, q〉) = qd. Combined with Lemma 7 and equivalence of
norms, we conclude that ‖t‖∞ ≥ ‖t‖√n−1 ≥
T2(t)√
n(n−1) ≥
N(t)1/(n−1)√
n
≥ qβ√
n
, which
implies N(B, d) = 0 when d ≥ β(n − 1).
Suppose that d < β(n − 1), then N(B, d) ≤ (2B)n−1−d. Let t = ∑n−2i=0 tiXi,
h =
∑d
i=0 hiX
i and t′ =
∑n−2−d
i=0 t
′
iX
i. From t = ht′, we have
(t0, · · · , tn−2−d) = (t′0, · · · , t′n−2−d)
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
h0 h1 · · · hn−2−d
h0 h1
...
h0
. . .
. . . h1
h0
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
The constant coefficient of h0 is non-zero modulo prime q, so the polynomial t′
will be determined once the (n−1−d) low-order coefficients of t are determined,
and vice versa. Thus each possible t is uniquely decided by its (n−1−d) low-order
coefficients and this leads to N(B, d) ≤ (2B)n−1−d.
Notice that the number of subsets of S is 2|S| and the number of s ∈ Rq/IS
divisible by h =
∏
i∈S′(X − φi) of degree d is q|S|−d. Thus the probability p can
be bounded as follows:
p ≤ 2|S| max
d<β(n−1)
(2B)m(n−1−d)
(q − 1)m(|S|−d) · q
|S|−d ≤ 2n−1 max
d<β(n−1)
(2B)m(n−1−d)( q
q−1 )
n−1−d
(q − 1)(m−1)(|S|−d) .
Since n ≥ 7, q = 1 mod n and β ≤ 1 − 1m , we have (2B)m( qq−1 ) < (q − 1)βm
and then
max
d<β(n−1)
(2B)m(n−1−d)( qq−1 )
n−1−d
(q − 1)(m−1)(|S|−d) < (q−1)
βm(n−1)−(m−1)|S|+β(n−1)(m−1−βm)
=(q−1)−(n−1).
We now complete the proof.
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B Proof of Theorem 2
For a ∈ R×q , we define Pra = Prf1,f2 ((y1 + pf1)/(y2 + pf2) = a), where fi ←↩
D×r,zi . It suffices to prove that |Pra−(q−1)−(n−1)| ≤ 2
2(n−1)+5
q(n−1) ·(q−1)−(n−1) =: ′
for all except a fraction ≤ 22(n−1)
(q−1)(n−1) of a ∈ R×q .
To translate Pra into a more straightforward form, we introduce another
probability Pra = Prf1,f2 [a1f1 + a2f2 = a1z1 + a2z2] for a = (a1, a2) ∈ (R×q )2,
and then obtain Pra = Pr−a2·a−11 after a simple computation. For (a1, a2) ∈
(R×q )2, we consider the equation a1f1 + a2f2 = a1z1 + a2z2 of the pair (f1, f2).
All its solutions form the set z+a⊥×, where z = (z1, z2) and a⊥× = a⊥
⋂
(R×q +
qZn−1)2. Then, we have
Pra =
DZ2(n−1),r(z + a⊥×)
DZn−1,r(z1 + R×q + qZn−1) · DZn−1,r(z2 + R×q + qZn−1)
.
Thanks to a ∈ (R×q )2, for any (x1, x2) ∈ a⊥, the elements x1 and x2 lie in the
same ideal IS of Rq. To circumvent the restriction on invertibility, we exploit the
inclusion-exclusion principle and change the three above sums into the following
forms.
DZ2(n−1),r(z + a
⊥×) =
∑
S⊆{1,··· ,n−1}
(−1)|S| · DZ2(n−1),r(z + a⊥(IS)), (1)
D
Zn−1,r(zi+R×q +qZn−1) =
∑
S⊆{1,··· ,n−1}
(−1)|S| ·D
Z
2(n−1),r(zi+IS+qZ
n−1
), for i ∈ {1, 2}. (2)
First, let’s prove the Eq. 1. For DZ2(n−1),r(z + a⊥(IS)) with |S| ≤ (n − 1),
let δ = q−(n−1)−(n−1) and m = 2, then Lemma 13 implies that, for all except
a fraction ≤ 2n−1
(q−1)(n−1) of a ∈ (R×q )2,
∣∣∣D
Z2(n−1),r(z + a
⊥(IS)) − q−(n−1)−|S|
∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣D
Z2(n−1),r,−z(a
⊥(IS)) − q−(n−1)−|S|
∣∣∣ ≤ 2δ.
For the case |S| > (n − 1), we can find S′ ⊆ S with |S′| = (n − 1). Because
a⊥(IS) ⊆ a⊥(IS′), we have DZ2(n−1),r,−z(a⊥(IS)) ≤ DZ2(n−1),r,−z(a⊥(IS′)).
Using the result proven before, we conclude that DZ2(n−1),r,−z(a⊥(IS)) ≤ 2δ +
q−(n−1)−(n−1). Therefore, the following inequality holds
∣
∣
∣
∣DZ2(n−1),r(z + a
⊥×) − (q − 1)
n−1
q2(n−1)
∣
∣
∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∑
S⊆{1,··· ,n−1}
(−1)|S|
(
DZ2(n−1),r(z + a
⊥(IS)) − q−(n−1)−|S|
)
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
≤2nδ + 2
n−1∑
k=(n−1)
(
n − 1
k
)
q−(n−1)−(n−1) ≤ 2n+1q−(n−1)−(n−1),
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for all except a fraction ≤ 22(n−1)
(q−1)(n−1) of a ∈ (R×q )2.
Next, we are to prove the Eq. 2. Let δ = q−(n−1)/2. Lemma 2 shows that
λn−1(LIS ) ≤ n · q|S|/(n−1). For S of cardinality ≤ (n−1)/2, by Lemma 1, we get
that r ≥ ηδ(IS + qZn−1). Using Lemma 4, we know |DZn−1,r,−zi(IS + qZn−1) −
q−|S|| ≤ 2δ. For the case |S| > (n − 1)/2, using the same argument, we have
DZn−1,r,−zi(IS + qZ
n−1) ≤ 2δ + q−(n−1)/2. Therefore,
∣
∣
∣
∣DZn−1,r(zi + R×q + qZn−1) −
(q − 1)n−1
qn−1
∣
∣
∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∑
S⊆{1,··· ,n−1}
(−1)|S|
(
DZ2(n−1),r(zi + IS + qZ
n−1) − q−|S|
)
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
≤2n(δ + q−(n−1)/2) = 2n+1q−(n−1)/2.
Overall, we prove that, except for a fraction ≤ 22(n−1)
(q−1)(n−1) of a ∈ (R×q )2,
DZ2(n−1),r(z + a
⊥×) = (1 + δ0) · (q − 1)
n−1
q2(n−1)
,
DZn−1,r(zi + R×q + qZn−1) = (1 + δi) ·
(q − 1)n−1
qn−1
, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
where |δi| ≤ 22nq−(n−1) for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, which implies that |Pra − (q −
1)−(n−1)| ≤ ′.
C Proof of Lemma 20
Let A be the given IND-CPA attack algorithm. Given oracle O that outputs k
samples drawn from either U(R×q × Rq) or A×s,ψ for previously chosen s ←↩ ψ.
We construct an algorithm B to solve RLWE×HNF . Algorithm B first calls O to
get k samples (h′1, C
′
1), · · · , (h′k, C ′k). Then algorithm B picks i ←↩ U({1, · · · , k})
and calculates the public key hi = p · h′i. When A outputs a challenge message
pair (M0,M1), B picks b ←↩ U({0, 1}), computes the challenge ciphertext Ci =
p ·C ′i +Mb and sends it to A. Finally, A outputs its guess b′, and then B outputs
1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
All h′i’s are uniformly random in R×q , and thus so are the public keys hi’s
due to p ∈ R×q . Theorem 2 shows that the statistical distance between the
distribution of the public key given to A and that in the genuine attack is q−Ω(n).
Furthermore, if O outputs samples from A×s,ψ, the pair (hi, Ci) is of the form
(hi, his+pe+Mb) which corresponds to actual “public key and ciphertext” pair
in the IND-CPA attack. Therefore A succeeds and B outputs 1 with probability
≥ 12 + δ − q−Ω(n).
If O outputs samples from U(R×q × Rq), then Ci is uniformly random in Rq
and independent of b. Algorithm B outputs 1 with probability 1/2 in this case.
Thus the advantage of B in distinguishing U(R×q ×Rq) and A×s,ψ is greater than
δ/2 − q−Ω(n).
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